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Economics and psychology share many common interests regarding the 
behavior of people in the marketplace. However, these two disciplines 
have traditionally approached the description, prediction and 
explanation of market behavior in very different ways. �Psychologists 
have employed laboratory experiments, survey questionnaires, and 
some naturalistic observations to develop an empirical base of knowledge. 
Economists have relied heavily on utility theory and its presumption of 
objective rationality which, as Simon and Stedry (1969) note, ". 
permits strong predictions to be made about behavior without the painful 
necessity of observing people" (p. 272). 
Over the past quarter century, a small group of economists and 
psychologists have been challenging the validity of the traditional 
economic approach. George Katona and his colleagues showed that consumer 
expectations, perceptions, motives and intentions, measured by means of 
survey techniques, could predict economic behavior and guide public 
policy in situations where traditional theory was simply not adequate 
(Katona, 1975). 
In parallel with Katona, Herbert Simon was drawing from empirical 
research on human cognitive limitations to challenge traditional 
assumptions about the motivation, omniscience and computational capacities 
of "economic man." As an alternative· to utility maximization, Simon 
(1957) introduced the notion of "bounded rationality," which asserts 
that cognitive limitations force people to construct simplified models 
Presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Economic Association, New York, December 1977. 
2 
of the world in order .to cope with it. To predict behavior 
" • . •  we must understand the way in which this simplified 
model is constructed, and its construction will certainly be 
related to 'man's' psychological properties as a perceiving, 
thinking, and learning animal" (Simon, 1957, p. 198). 
During the past 20 years, the skeleton theory of bounded rationality 
has been fleshed out. We have learned much about human cognitive 
limitations and their implications for behavior--particularly with 
regard to decisions made in the face of risk. Space does·not permit a 
discussion of this work here; an extensive review 0 is available in 
Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein.· (1976). Utility theory has been the 
target of repeated criticisms, both on theoretical and empirical 
grounds. One of the most recent and most vigorous attacks can be 
found in Kahneman and Tversky (in press). However, the case against 
the rationality of individual behavior tends to be dismissed by 
economists on the grounds that in the competitive world outside the 
laboratory� rational agents will survive at the expense of others. 
Thus, the study of irrationality can be downplayed as the study of 
transient phenomena (Simon & Stedry, 1969). 
Our own experiences, as economist and psychologist collaboratively 
investigating people's protective actions in the face of risk, indicate 
that many manifestations of bounded rationality exhibited by 
intelligent citizens have important, non-transient social ramifications. 
The study of insurance behavior provides an example to which we now 
turri. 
I. Failure of the Market in Insurance
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Insurance is perhaps the oldest arrangement for shifting the 
financial burden from an economic agent facing uncertain future losses 
to a risk-bearing institution. Economists have treated this problem as 
one in which the prices for different types of policies are set by the 
forces of uspply and demand with individuals making theoretical contingent 
contracts to protect themselves against different states of the world. 
Observed market failures have been ascribed to adverse selection and 
moral hazard, problems which inhibit insurers from promoting their 
product (Arrow, 1963). 
Because economists have focused primarily on market mechanisms 
for studying social problems, they have paid relatively little 
attention to the impact that alternative institutional arrangements would 
have on behavior if an insurance market fails. Because they have 
assumed that individuals are utility maximizers, they have devoted 
little effort to studying the decision processes that individuals 
follow when determining whether to undertake protective action. 
Psychologists, on the other hand, have been actively studying risk-taking 
·decisions by means of laboratory experiments but have only recently
begun to focus on the implications of their findings for public
policy (Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1976).
In this section, we will discuss a recently completed laboratory 
and field study that examined decision processes involved in the 
purchase of flood and earthquake insurance. The details of this study 
', 
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are summarized in Kunreuther, Ginsberg, Miller, Sagi, Slavic, Barkan 
and Katz (1978) and Slavic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan and· 
Combs (1977). We will describe the study and its results through the 
use of the simple conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1. This 
framework emphasizes the central importance of institutional 
arrangements and decision processes in developing policies for solving 
specific problems and should have relevance :t_o iriany!..��f iitaLCd:e"c:Csio"-ds 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
A. Nature of the Problem
Natural disasters constitute an enormous problem. They annually
cause several billion dollars in property damage, accompanied by an 
inestimable toll of human misery, anguish, and death. 
The question facing public policy makers is: What are the relative 
costs and benefits of alternative programs for mitigating the social 
and economic d1sruption caused by natural disasters? In the case of 
floods, policy options that have been tried or considered include 
compulsory insurance, flood control systems, strict regulation of land 
usage, and massive public relief to victims. 
B. Institutional Arrangements
The institutional arrangements that concerned us here focused on
whether or not the purchase of disaster insurance should be required. 
It has been noted that, whereas few individuals insure themselves 
voluntarily against the consequences of natural disasters, many turn 
to the federal government for aid after suffering losses (Kunreuther, 
1973). As a result, the taxpayer is burderied with financing the 
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recovery for those who could have provided for themselves by purchasing 
insurance. Policy makers have argued that both the government and 
the property owners at risk would be better off financially under a 
federal flood-insurance program. Such a program would shift the 
burden of disasters from the general taxpayer to individuals living in 
hazard-prone areas and would thus promote wiser decisions regarding 
the use of flood plains. For example, insurance rates could be set 
proportional to the magnitude of risk in order to inform residents of 
--......w �-,.., � -- ---�- ·-
• <(:l.J?�§.S • .• ·-·. 
Without a better understanding of how people perceive and react to 
risks, however, there is no way of knowing what sort of flood-insurance 
program would be most effective. For example, it seems reasonable that 
lowering the cost of _insurance would encourage people to buy it. Yet, 
there is evidence that people do not voluntarily insure themselves 
against natural disasters even when the rates are highly subsidized 
(Kunreuther, 1973).. The reasons for failure of insurance markets need 
to be understood, as they have important implications for policy. 
Knowledge of how psychological,.economic and environmental factors 
influence insurance purchasing may suggest ways to increase voluntary 
purchases--or indicate the need for compulsory insurance programs. 
C. Decision Processes
Our primary objective in this study was to determine the critical
factors influencing the voluntary purchase of insurance against the 
consequences of low-probability events such as floods or earthquakes. 
Research methods included a field survey and laboratory experiments. 
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The field survey enabled us to discover differences between insured 
and uninsured homeowners in hazard-prone areas, while the laboratory 
experiments permitted.us to identify causal relationships through 
controlled manipulation of relevant variables. 
The basic sampling plan for the field survey involved face-to-face 
interviews with 2055 homeowners living in flood-prone areas throughout 
the United States and 1006 homeowners in 18 earthquake-prone areas of 
California. Approximately half of the sampled individuals were insured 
against flood or earthquake. 
The analysis of the field survey data revealed that a significant 
number of homeowners in flood and earthquake-prone areas either knew 
nothing about the availability and terms of insurance or had inaccurate 
information. The survey also revealed that many residents had little 
idea of the probability or potential damage from a future disaster. 
Furthermore, the insurance decisions of persons who did have firm 
notions of expected losses, premium costs, etc., were often inconsistent 
with what would have been predicted by the expected utility model. One 
of the most surprising results was the large number of uninsured 
homeowners who expected no federal aid at all in the aftermath of a 
major disaster. This indicated that neglect of insurance could not be 
attributed to expectations of generous government relief. 
In the laboratory experiments, subjects were presented with a series 
of gambles,each of which involved a specified probability of losing a 
given amount of money. Losses and probabilities were varied across 
gambles. In one experiment subjects were permitted to buy insurance 
against the loss at an actuarially fair rate., Additional experiments 
,,... .... , •... 
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varied the premiums so that insurance was offered at subsidized rates 
and commercial rates. In these experiments, subjects considered 
well-defined insurance problems in isolation and without real stakes 
at risk. ·To supplement this format, ·an elaborate farm management game 
was designed and run by a computer. While playing this game over a 
five-hour period, individuals had to decide for each year what crops 
they were going to plant, :�h.af ·. fertilizers to use and what insurance
they would purchase against various natural hazards. Subjects' earnings 
in the game determined their salary. 
The results from the experiments consistently showed that people 
preferred to insure against relatively high-probability, low-�oss 
hazards and tended to reject insurance in situations where the probability 
of loss was low and the potential losses were high. These results 
suggest that people's natural predispositions run counter to traditional 
economic theory (e.g., Friedman and Savage, 1948), which assumes that 
·risk-averse individuals should desire a mechanism to protect them from
rare, catas.trophic losses that they could not bear themselves.
When asked about their insurance decisions; subjects in both the 
laboratory and survey studies indicated a disinclination to worry about 
low-probability hazards. Such a strategy is understandable in view 
of the fact that limitations of people's time, energy and attentional 
capacities create a "finite reservoir of concern�" Unless we ignored 
many low-probability threats we would become so burdened that any sort 
pf productive life would become impossible. Another insight gleaned 
. from the experiments and the survey is that people viewed insurance as 
an investment. Making claims and receiving payments (by insuring 
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against probable losses) makes them think they are getting more for 
their premium dollars. Insuring against hazards that don't occur 
seems a waste of money. 
D. Policies and Incentives
Our study has led us to conclude that the primary cause of failure
for the disaster insurance market is consumer disinterest. If insurance 
is to be marketed on a voluntary basis, then consumer's attitudes and 
information processing limitations must be taken into account. Policy 
makers and insurance providers must find ways to communicate the risks 
and arouse concern for the hazards. One method found to work in the 
laboratory experiments is to increase the perceived probability of 
disaster by lengthening the individual's time horizon. For example, 
considering the risk of experiencing a 100 year flood at least once 
during a 25 year period, instead of considering the risk in one year, 
raises the probability to .22 and may thus cast flood insurance in a 
more favorable light. (.Aliotfier \-itep w.9uld�'fta,}1;.� i�s.u;i:'ance ageg(s-:Pla'y 
(an��;:is;:tJv!= role in educating homeowners about the proper use of insurance 
as a protective mechanism and providing information about the 
availability of insurance, rate schedules, deductible values, etc. Of 
course, these actions may not be effective. It may also be necessary 
to institute some form of mandatory coverage, perhaps having banks and 
other financial institutions require disaster insurance as a condition 
for a mortgage. 
II. Future Directions
As the world has become safer on the average, it has become 
-- -- -- - ------ - --
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potentially more dangerous at the extreme. Thus., even as technology 
has increased life expectancy, it has multiplied the potential for 
catastrophic losses due to carcinogenic chemicals, radiation releases, 
warfare, dam failures, etc. Reduction of technological risks typically 
entails substantial costs, including reduction of benefits as well. 
When weighing the benefits against the risks of technology, the ultimate 
question becomes "How safe is safe enough?" We believe that economic 
psychology (or psychological economics) can help provide answers to this 
difficult question. The' ,i�fra�e�r�Jn-_F}g_u:i;_e -t'·m�f .b.��a-.��e'.fQf-__ � • ."f � ·c ·-; - .•. -
starting point for addressing questions of acceptable risk in a way 
that will be helpful to system designers and policy makers. Thus, 
for example, when designing a set of regulatory mechanisms or incentive 
attention must be paid to the current institutional arrangements and 
decision processes of the groups affected by that problem. Current 
programs imply a set of risk-benefit tradeoffs and values of life which 
may be inappropriate for today's society when scrutinized in this way. 
On the other hand, the costs J:n:Cu_r:recl by: -�h.i:m:g{.j;ig· 1ne;�_e.�i.{ff�nt programs 
• 
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also have to be recognized. 
At present, economists and psychologists seem to favor different 
approaches towards determining acceptable levels of risk. Economists 
have traditionally favored a market approach .. in which they assume that 
the forces of supply·and demand will determine an optimal balance between 
the risks and benefits associated with any activity. There has been a 
growing recognition in recent years that environmental and technological 
problems involve both public and private risks. The public good (or bad) 
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aspects of the risk call for governmental regulation or the use of 
other social institutions to cope with problems of market failure 
(Lave, 1972).· ·These programs are typically not designed with concern 
for people's information processing limitations, nor are the public's 
judgments of risks and benefits of current and proposed systems usually 
considered. 
Psychologists have preferred to ask people to express their 
risk preferences directly (see e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, 
Read and Combs, 1976). SucR an approach enables policy makers to 
gain insight into current attitudes and values. It also allows for 
widespread citizen involvement in decision making and thus has political 
appeal. Its principal drawback is that people may not really know what 
they want or why they attach certain costs and benefits to different 
activities. In fact, different ways of phrasing the same question 
may elicit different preferences. Furthermore, people's values may 
change so rapidly as to·make systematic planning impossible. Even if 
their risk preferences were stable over time, it might be difficult to 
translate their desires into meaningful policies without substantial 
implementation,costs. 
Policy decisions regulating risk must ultimately consider both 
what p�ople say they want and what their market behavior implies they 
want. These two approaches to assessing public preferences should be 
complimentary rather than competing. Integrating these approaches and 
developing them to a level sufficient to engender public acceptance 
poses an exciting opportunity for collaboration between economists 
and psychologists. 
III. Conclusion
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Policy makers responsible for protecting society from natural 
and technological hazards need to understand the ways in which people 
think about risk and uncertainty. Without such understanding, 
well-intended policies may not achieve their goals and, indeed, may 
even·backfire. Because rationality is "bounded," utility theory is 
not a trustworthy guide for policy. The understanding that is needed 
must come instead from systematic, multidisciplinary empirical 
investigation. 
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